

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6947

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 06131

NODIS CHEROKEE

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FOR SECRETARY AND SAUNDERS FROM ATHERTON

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP(ATHERTON, ALFRED L., JR.)

SUBJECT: FORTHCOMING ATHERTON TALKS IN JERUSALEM AND CAIRO

U. S. DEL NO. 6

1. MIKE AND I HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO OUR FORTHCOMING TALKS IN JERUSALEM(JULY 27 - 28) AND CAIRO(JULY 29 - 30). THE MORE WE REFLECT ON THE RESULTS OF THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE SECRETARY'S LAST BILATERAL WITH DAYAN, AND ON WHAT WE KNOW OF THE WEIZMAN/SADAT MEETING IN AUSTRIA, THE MORE WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT BEFORE PLUNGING INTO THE PREPARATION OF DETAILED TALKING POINTS, WE NEED TO DEFINE MORE CLEARLY THAN WE HAVE TO DATE WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE IN THIS PERIOD BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. THOSE OBJECTIVES, IN TURN, DEPEND UPON THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE POLICY SESSION WHICH BILL QUANDT TOLD US IN LONDON HE WOULD TRY TO SET UP FOR EARLY THIS WEEK AND WHICH I ASSUME WILL FOCUS ON THE GAME PLAN FOR THE SECRETARY'S EARLY AUGUST MIDDLE EAST TRIP AND BEYOND.

2. BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY SHORT TIME FUSE BEFORE WE SIT DOWN WITH THE ISRAELIS THIS THURSDAY, WE WILL BE SENDING YOU A FIRST CUT AT
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TALKING POINTS FOR OUR JERUSALEM MEETINGS IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS OR SO ONCE WE HAVE A READ-OUT ON THE SUNDAY ISRAELI CABINET MEETING WHICH, DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS IN TAIF, WE PROBABLY WON'T HAVE UNTIL WE GET TO AMMAN MIDDAY MONDAY. (THIS MESSAGE IS BEING PREPARED IN TAIF FOR TRANSMISSION TO YOU AS SOON AS WE LAND IN AMMAN.)

3. AT THIS POINT, THE FOLLOWING IS AN OUTLINE OF HOW WE VISUALIZE OUR

TALKS IN JERUSALEM (WE ARRIVE THERE EARLY AFTERNOON WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, BUT HAVE ASKED THAT NO MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS BE SCHEDULED BEFORE THURSDAY MORNING);

--REPORT ON MY TALKS IN TAIF AND AMMAN.

--REVIEW RESULTS OF LEEDS CASTLE TALKS UNDER FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

(1) ASK FOR ISRAELI ASSESSMENT, INCLUDING RESULTS OF CABINET AND KNESSET DEBATES.

(2) PROVIDE OUR ASSESSMENT OF AREAS OF COMMON GROUND AND OF DISAGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO (A) FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, AND (B) POST FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. WE WOULD ENVISAGE IN PARTICULAR FOCUSING ON EGYPTIAN "THREE-STAGE" IDEA AND "END OF OCCUPATION" CONCEPT.

--PROSPECTS FOR AND NATURE OF NEXT TRILATERAL ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN-U. S. MEETING, AND ANY BILATERAL ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN MEETING (WEIZMAN-SADAT/GAMASY) THAT MAY BE IN THE OFFING.

--ANY POINTS ISRAELIS WANT ME TO EXPLORE IN CAIRO.

4. CAIRO(OR ALEXANDRIA) TALKS JULY 29 - 30 WILL OBVIOUSLY BE MORE CRITICAL AND REQUIRE THE MOST CAREFUL THINKING THROUGH. I SEE NO SENSE IN OUR TRYING TO DRAFT TALKING POINTS HERE UNTIL WE HAVE RESULTS

OF (A) HERMANN'S INITIAL SOUNDINGS FOLLOWING LEEDS CASTLE TALKS, (B) ISRAELI CABINET AND KNESSET DEBATES, AND (C) WASHINGTON POLICY REVIEW.

WHAT FOLLOWS BELOW, THEREFORE, IS OUR BROAD BRUSH INPUT INTO (C) WITHOUT BENEFIT OF (A) AND (B).

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5. IT SEEMS TO US WE NEED TO CONSIDER DISCUSSING NEXT STEPS WITH SADAT

IN TERMS OF TWO BROAD ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES:

A. HOW TO PURSUE STRATEGY WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING SINCE CAMP DAVID. IN

BROAD OUTLINE, THIS REQUIRES (1) SADAT'S COMMITMENT TO ON-GOING PROCESS OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER WE PUT FORWARD OUR SUGGESTIONS TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES (ALONG LINES WE HAVE

BEEN DISCUSSING, PERHAPS MODIFIED BY HAL'S MORE OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED

IDEAS), AND (2) SADAT'S WILLINGNESS TO LIVE FOR SOME TIME WITH THE STALEMATE THAT THIS COULD PRODUCE.

B. SHIFT IN STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATION OF ANOTHER BUT MORE FAR-REACHING SINAI INTERIM AGREEMENT (SHORT OF FULL WITHDRAWAL AND SHORT OF FULL PEACE), COUPLED WITH WEST BANK/GAZA AGREEMENT WHICH FOCUSES ON FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN TERMS OF ENDING OCCUPATION, ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND A JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN ROLE, BUT WHICH STOPS SHORT OF PRIOR COMMITMENT EITHER (1) TO RESOLVE FINAL STATUS OF TERRITORY ON BASIS APPLICATION OF RESOLU-

TION 242 "ON ALL FRONTS" AFTER FIVE YEARS, OR (2) TO FULL RANGE OF NORMAL, PEACEFUL RELATIONS. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD NEED UNDER THIS OPTION TO FIND A FORMULA TO DEAL WITH LAND ACQUISITION BY ISRAELIS DURING FIVE-YEAR PERIOD- PERHAPS BILL QUANDT'S IDEA OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RIGHT TO PURCHASE PRIVATELY-OWNED BUT NOT GOVERNMENT-OWNED, LAND.

6. THESE TWO ALTERNATIVES OBVIOUSLY HAVE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED RAMIFICATIONS, AND OUR PURPOSE IN THIS MESSAGE IS TO CALL ATTENTION TO

THE PROBLEM AS IT BEARS ON MY TALKS IN CAIRO RATHER THAN TRYING TO SECRET

ANALYZE THEM FULLY FROM HERE. ONE OBSERVATION, HOWEVER, IF THAT THE SECRET

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NODIS CHEROKEE

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TWO ALTERNATIVES CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS OPTIONS WE MIGHT PRESENT TO SADAT FOR HIM TO CHOOSE. IN OTHER WORDS WE MIGHT TALK TO HIM ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: IF HE WISHES WE ARE PREPARED TO CARRY THROUGH WITH OUR UNDERTAKING TO PUT FORWARD U. S. IDEAS WHICH CALL ON ISRAEL TO COMMIT ITSELF TO DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA AFTER FIVE YEARS ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL FROM THESE TERRITORIES. HOWEVER, WE NEED TO SHARE WITH HIM A SENSE OF REALISM ABOUT WHAT IS LIKELY TO ENSUE FROM

THIS COURSE OF ACTION. ISRAEL WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY REJECT THIS AND WE MAY BE FACED WITH A STAND-OFF FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD WITHOUT ANY WAY OF ENSURING THAT WE CAN BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN ISRAELI POLICY

IN THE SHORT TERM, WHILE IN THE MEANTIME THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BECOME MORIBUND. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE ANOTHER BUT MORE FAR-REACHING INTERIM AGREEMENT AS OUTLINED IN PARA. 5B. HERE THERE WOULD BE A FAR BETTER CHANCE FOR ACHIEVING ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN THE SHORT TERM, AND HENCE OF MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SADAT WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH THE ADVANTAGES OF EITHER COURSE.

7. THE PARTIAL AGREEMENT ALTERNATIVE HAS THE SALIENT WEAKNESS, WHICH SADAT AS WELL AS OURSELVES WOULD OF COURSE RECOGNIZE, OF NOT PROVIDING A BASIS FOR JORDAN OR THE PALESTINIANS TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS

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AND THIS BEING THE CASE, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW WE COULD GET ANYTHING TO HAPPEN ON THE GROUND ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IN EFFECT ONE WOULD BE LEFT WITH A FURTHER BILATERAL DEAL BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH ISRAEL OFFERING SOMETHING -- BUT NOT VERY MUCH IN ARAB EYES -- ON THE PALESTINIAN ASPECT. THIS CONCEIVABLY COULD HAVE THE SHOCK EFFECT OF MAKING THE OTHER ARABS COME TO THEIR SENSES AND BEGIN NEGOTIATING FOR REALISTIC OBJECTIVES IN A SUBSEQUENT PHASE (BUT ONE CAN HARDLY COUNT ON IT).

8. PERHAPS THE FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT IDEA DOES NOT HOLD WATER WHEN

ONE THINKS IT THROUGH BUT THERE MAY STILL BE AN ADVANTAGE IN POSING IT

TO SADAT. IF NOTHING ELSE, IT COULD BE AN INDIRECT WAY OF GETTING HIM

TO THINK THROUGH REALISTICALLY WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN IF WE CARRY THROUGH WITH ALTERNATIVE 5A.

9. IF YOU WANT TO FOLLOW UP IDEAS IN THIS MESSAGE, OR ANY YOU MAY HAVE

ON SECURE PHONE, WE EXPECT TO BE OPERATIONAL IN AMMAN BY MID-AFTERNOON AMMAN TIME, MONDAY, JULY 24. NEA STAFF AIDES SHOULD HAVE OUR PRECISE AMMAN SCHEDULE BY THEN, SO YOU CAN PINPOINT WHEN, WHERE AND HOW TO REACH US.

10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS AND TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS. SUDDARTH

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